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MANAGING THE SOCIAL/KNOWLEDGE 
EQUATION 
ALBERTO CORSÍN JIMÉNEZ 
Let me start with mathematics. Mathematics, economists argue, are 
good to think public knowledge with.1 Once made public, no matter 
how often a mathematical theorem is taught, she who knows it cannot 
have the knowledge taken away; economists call this property of public 
knowledge, ‘non-rivalry’: my knowledge of a subject poses no threat or 
rivalry to someone else’s. On the other hand, once a theorem is 
published, anyone with the will and skills to learn it can have free access 
to the theorem; economists call this property of public knowledge, ‘non-
excludability’: knowledge is public when no one is excluded nor 
discriminated from accessing it. 
Note that both non-rivalry and non-excludability define the 
qualities of public knowledge in terms of epistemic abundance or 
surplus: knowledge is public if it cannot be depleted by generalised 
access or consumption. If my holding of knowledge subtracts nothing 
from what others can have, then we may say that what makes 
knowledge public is also what makes it as ‘big’ as society: no matter 
how many people are out there consuming it, knowledge will remain 
public if its stock remains at a par with, for lack of a better word, Society.  
In this article I would like to inquire into the sociological 
imagination of public knowledge as ‘something as Big as Society’. I am 
intrigued by the terms through which mainstream economic sociology 
imagines the relationship between knowledge and society, and in 
particular by the ways in which such relationship is said to hold public 
value. 
My interest in the public qualities of knowledge is a response to a 
prevailing discourse in the academy that equates the social production 
                                         
1  For example, Dominique Foray explains the nature of the ‘public good 
problem’ (the problem that accrues when the net private gain of producing a 
good is less than the net social gain of having it available) by asking about the 
distributive justice of mathematical theories: ‘What is the social return of 
Pythagoras’s work and how can it be rewarded “fairly”?’ (Foray 2006: 114–
15). A similar analogy is drawn by Joseph Stiglitz (1999: 308). My remarks 
build on their analogies. 
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of knowledge with its public value. There is a sense in which calls for 
promoting interdisciplinary research and collaboration, or the transfer of 
scientific knowledge to society, are all premised on the assumption that 
there is something inherently public about knowledge, which can be 
brought out and extrapolated if properly managed. Management, public 
value and knowledge are becoming thus correlative terms in a univocal 
institutional project. 
In this light, the article sets out a preliminary inquiry into 
‘management’ as an anthropological category. I want to understand how 
management produces knowledge, and how and when this knowledge 
takes an epistemic as well as a self-consciously social form. Following 
the lead of Marilyn Strathern’s Huxley Memorial lecture, I am interested 
in the forms of ‘micro-management’ through which knowledge is lent 
different leases on life through different social practices (Strathern 2006: 
192). A central concern of the article, then, is to try to elucidate what is 
involved in producing knowledge in contemporary knowledge-
management contexts, and to disentangle different modes of production 
from different moments of social recognition. Thus, I am interested in 
the consequences for anthropological theory of one being able to speak 
at all of ‘managing the social/knowledge equation’. 
The article reports on two recent field experiences where I have 
been documenting and studying the production and management of 
knowledge as an explicit political and economic resource: fieldwork 
among historians of science and philologists at Spain’s National 
Research Council in Madrid; and among knowledge and architectural 
management consultants working for one of the world’s largest oil 
companies in Buenos Aires. My interest is in the social processes 
through which knowledge appears ethnographically as an object of 
public concern in contemporary knowledge management contexts. In 
what follows I attempt to sketch a repertoire of forms through which 
knowledge made its appearance and was managed in these two 
institutional settings.2 Some of these forms are common to both 
                                         
2  I borrow here from Annelise Riles approach to the study of bureaucratic 
formations (2001). In this context, a form carries both descriptive and analytic 
potency. For example, ‘guesswork’ as used below describes both a personal 
experience and an institutional pattern. The qualities that I ascribe to 
knowledge below are formative because they are both intersubjective and 
institutionally interobjective. In this guise, the revelation of how forms work, 
indeed, of what they do, echoes Latour’s definition of the term, where the 
form is ‘simply something which allows something else to be transported 
from one site to another.’ (Latour 2005: 223) Thus, guesswork is a form for 
transporting knowledge about management, and in so doing, a form of 
‘knowledge management’ itself. 
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institutions; some are unique to either of them. Importantly, all forms 
are recognisable by people in both organisations. They include things like 
the fragility of knowledge practices; the orientation of knowledge 
towards self-contextualisation or reversibility; its economic optimism, 
purity and shamelessness; or its structural serendipity, capriciousness 
and repetitive scale. 
My suggestion here, briefly put, is that parlance of ‘knowledge 
management’ has made vigorously explicit certain hidden, historical 
assumptions about social theory’s own sociological ontology. In 
particular, it has made clear to what extent modern social theory has 
created and upholds styles of reasoning and argumentative logics that 
juxtapose and play off certain categories of analysis against others. This 
‘playing off’ of a set of categories against others is most prominent in the 
very way in which ‘knowledge’ and ‘the social’ have been made to work 
as correlates of each other. More to the point, such correlation entails 
imagining an equation between knowledge and the social where each 
becomes a proportionate form for the other. Deleuze once observed how 
central to Baroque thought was the imagination of two organising 
forces: the vertical, which concentrated the expressiveness of the world 
into one intentional and singular moment; and the horizontal, which 
informed the harmony between the world’s different parts. ‘To the 
degree that the world is now made up of divergent series… [a] vertical 
harmonic can no longer be distinguished from a horizontal harmonic… 
The two begin to fuse on a sort of diagonal’ (Deleuze 1993: 137). The 
diagonal, for Deleuze, was emblematic of our neo-Baroque age. In what 
follows I explore the diagonal or proportional form that emerges from 
contemporary knowledge/social assemblages. 
The horizontal: public knowledge 
In Public goods, private goods, philosopher Raymond Geuss offers a 
genealogical analysis of the public/private distinction and its relation to 
the human condition (Geuss 2001). One of the contexts he studies is the 
notion of the public as a space to which anyone can have access to and 
where there is maximal observation of what he calls the principle of 
‘disattendability’, that is, the principle of unobtrusive behaviour to 
others in public places. His exemplar is the famous episode of Diogenes 
of Sinope’s masturbation in the marketplace (Geuss 2001: 12–13), where 
intimacy, privacy and the public collapse shamefully onto one another. 
Following Geuss, we may observe that there is an intriguing sense in 
which disgust, human vulnerability and the inside/outside of a body 
map onto the cultural form of the classical western public. In this view, 
the public is a shameless object. It is the main place where we are all 
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strangers to one another, and hence where there is no place for disgust. 
We cannot pollute others in public.3 
Now it is perhaps not a coincidence that the most recent economic 
theory (e.g. Cornes & Sandler 1996: 6) defines public goods as 
‘externalities’, in other words, as agencies that create effects beyond their 
original catchment area. Music is a public good because anyone coming 
within earshot of a street musician, for instance, will benefit from 
exposure.4 Thus defined, economic public goods are essentially 
polluting agencies, insofar as they stretch out and spill over into 
extraneous and foreign environments. It is this surplus or excessive 
feature of (positive) externalities that lends them their public quality.  
Let me add a third quality to the modern liberal conception of the 
public (beyond those of shamelessness and excessiveness). That is that 
the public is a space of horizontal relationality. This follows from the 
public being conceived as a conceptual meeting point for social 
relationships unburdened with shame and disgust. To address the 
public is to relate horizontally: to relate with no effect, bringing shame to 
no one, disgusting no one, polluting no one. Michael Warner hints at 
this when noting that in public spaces we encounter ‘stranger-
relationality in a pure form’ (Warner 2005: 75). One can embrace the 
whole world in a relationship of strangeness, because nothing is at stake 
except sheer and fleeting connectivity with others. It is for this reason 
that Warner criticises those academics who misunderstand the public 
nature of their work and who, ‘think[ing] in horizontal terms’, make the 
assumption that a good public intellectual is she ‘who seek[s] socially 
expansive audiences’ (Warner 2005: 144). 
Shamelessness, excessiveness and horizontal relationality lend the 
conception of the liberal public a particular social character, at once 
complex and contradictory and yet ultimately energetic and 
consequential. As a liberal political form, the public’s shamelessness pre-
empts pollution; as an economic agent, on the other hand, its virtue and 
desirability lies precisely in its capacity at bringing about pollution (i.e. 
at generating positive externalities and spillovers). It would seem, 
                                         
3  The etymology of the word, in fact, can be traced back to pubes and pubic: 
masculinity, sexuality, power and pollution are central to the western 
imagination of the public. 
4  Although the externality may be reversed: music may be too loud and 
deemed annoying, thus calling for the regulation of street performances, an 
example elaborated on by Geuss (2001: 93–94) 
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therefore, that pure relationships generate public objects, while public 
objects irradiate impure relationships.5  
The contaminating yet moral undertones of the liberal public 
resonate with current descriptions of the arrhythmia and self-
combustion of the new economies of knowledge. Mike Featherstone and 
Couze Venn, for example, have recently written about the epistemic 
change that digital networking may be effecting to our concept of 
‘knowledge’ (Featherstone & Venn 2006). The technological capacities of 
online communications, they argue, is bringing about a de-cadence of 
knowledge, a shift towards non-linear and a-synchronic, autopoietic and 
vitalistic modes of knowing. Indeed, knowledge itself as an 
epistemological enterprise may be gradually assuming the form of an 
existential politics. In their words,  
If a public involves self-organizing open communication amongst 
strangers, then there may be many emergent forms of public life. 
Rather than the model of the global public sphere, it can be argued that 
it would be more appropriate to think of ‘global public life’, with the 
displacement of the term ‘sphere’ by the term ‘life’ suggesting the 
difficulty of separating politics and aesthetics, and cognition and affect. 
The accent on life, furthermore, points to the potential for information 
to be conceived as alive, as an autopoietic system, or as a complex 
multiplicity which does not necessarily behave and act as a docile tool 
but rather is worldling, inventive and generative (Featherstone & Venn 
2006: 11). 
A somewhat similar point has been made by Nigel Thrift (2006), who 
sees in the rise of such an ontology of puissance (Featherstone & Venn 
2006: 11) capitalism’s latest reinvention. For Thrift, business is now 
attempting to locate value in a new distribution of the sensible (of affect 
and emotion, of the fleeting and transitory) as sheer contingent 
possibility. Characteristic of this phase of capitalist reorganisation is the 
extraction of surplus value around the ‘whole of the intellect’ (Thrift 
2006: 296). Capitalism is here factoring ‘existence’ itself into its profit 
margins, thus making self-knowledge and self-expression repositories of 
value. 
Ontologies of affect and vitalism lend knowledge unsuspected 
potency and energy. They render it into an almost self-combustive 
                                         
5  In outlining the qualities of the liberal public I have taken inspiration from 
Alastair Hannay’s recent study on the subject (Hannay 2005). For Hannay, the 
notion of ‘publicness’ works as a conceptual fund wherein notions of (i) 
liberal individuality, (ii) a space of intellectual and market exchanges, and (iii) 
new social and political audiences take form.  
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form.6 There are echoes here of Gabriel Tarde’s description of the 
economy of innovation as ‘germ-capital’, a mode of production 
organised around the pure openness and vibration of ideas (Lepinay 
2007). Philosophically, one may also read here an effect on the economy 
of what Peter Sloterdijk has dubbed ‘spherology’, the objectification of 
the world into ‘a sort of vibrant and hyperactive jelly’, where everything 
collides and creates effects on everything else (Sloterdijk 2007 [2005]: 29, 
my translation). But what draws my attention at this point is the image 
of the horizontal. When everything collides and creates effects on 
everything else, the history of economic thought has taught us to look 
for a market sociology (Mirowski 1994): a sociology of signals calling out 
and effecting changes upon other signals on a horizontal plane. Perhaps 
the most famous example of a market sociology for knowledge is 
Friedrich Hayek’s description of the surge of knowledge in a price 
system (Hayek 1945). 
For Hayek, knowledge is found distributed across society as 
circumstantial evidence, embedded in times and places, so frail and 
elusive that is often, especially among those scientifically minded, taken 
for non-knowledge, ‘apparently because in their scheme of things all 
such knowledge is supposed to be “given”’ (Hayek 1945: 522). Thus, for 
Hayek, one should not take knowledge for granted, but let it transpire 
and come-into-being instead as a self-evincing object. In this guise, the 
image recalls for instance the self-combustion and spontaneity of 
Featherstone and Venn’s autopoietic knowledge capitalism. Unlike 
Featherstone and Venn, however, Hayek thinks that the spontaneity of 
knowledge renders its intelligibility problematic. If knowledge crops up 
here, there and everywhere, then we are going to need some sort of 
mechanism or instrument that can point us in the direction of new 
knowledge appearances. The mechanism in charge of bringing all such 
                                         
6  The choice of word (combustion) is not gratuitous. The term aims to capture 
what some authors call the ‘infinite expansibility’ of public knowledge. Paul 
David cites Thomas Jefferson in this respect: 
That ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for 
the moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his 
condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by 
nature, when she made them, like fire expansible over all space, without 
lessening their density in any point, and like the air in which we breathe, 
move, and have our physical being, incapable of confinement or 
exclusive appropriation’ (cited in David 1993: 26, emphasis added). 
 Fire is also famously what lay at the centre of Françoise Quesnay’s economics 
of nature. For Quesnay, the ethereal and energetic matter of fire provided the 
material substance for the flow of productive forces in the physiological and 
ecological economy of nature (Christensen 1994). 
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knowledge within public purview is the price system. For Hayek, the 
price system works ‘as a kind of machinery for registering change, or a 
system of telecommunications which enables individual producers to 
watch merely the movement of a few pointers… in order to adjust their 
activities to changes of which they may never know more than is 
reflected in the price movement’ (Hayek 1945: 527). 
The price system renders society self-intelligent: every price signal 
points to a knowledge repository, which functions in turn as residency 
for (part of) society. Said differently, different parts of society tell us 
about their need for recognition through the price system; and we 
generate and develop the capacity to stock (economic) knowledge when 
we acknowledge their existence. Hayek’s economic sociology therefore 
maps Knowledge, Society and the Market onto one another, turning 
them into correlative terms in an equation. In its purest horizontal 
expression, Knowledge=Society=Market. And this is Public Knowledge. 
The vertical 
I noted in the introduction that one of the most interesting aspects of the 
new economy and management of knowledge is the way in which the 
production of knowledge is entangled in a variety of modes of social 
recognition. Indeed, the sociological imagination of the new economy, as 
we have seen above, blurs the distinction between production and 
sociality, so that the appearance and recognition of knowledge as an 
epistemic object is taken as an expression of social life’s inherent 
productive capacities; or said somewhat differently, is indicative of the 
way in which production and sociality are liable of commensuration. As 
we have seen above, today this is accomplished through the discursive 
and economic regimentation of ‘public value’. 
In what follows I want to explore ethnographically this equation 
between sociality and production, looking at the articulations between 
the two and interrogating the notion that the ‘management of 
knowledge’ should indeed be concerned with and capable of bringing 
about the commensurability of productive social forms (in the shape of 
public value).  
Over the past two years I have been involved in two separate 
although converging research projects. From June 2006 to September 
2007, I carried out fieldwork among historians of science and philologists 
at Spain’s National Research Council (CSIC). My time at the Council 
coincided with a critical moment of organisational change within the 
institution, when the humanities and social sciences (H&SS) were being 
relocated to a new building on the outskirts of Madrid. The move was 
seen by senior management as an opportunity to restructure the 
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academic organisation of the H&SS: academic departments were 
disbanded and researchers were asked to create or affiliate themselves 
with research groups, if possible in terms that would promote scientific 
interdisciplinarity and the transfer of knowledge to society. The 
movement of knowledge workers from one building to another was 
therefore taken as an opportunity to reshuffle and reorganise anew the 
very knowledge stock of their trade – an opportunity for making 
knowledge more responsive and dynamic. 
In September 2007, within days of having concluded my fieldwork 
in Madrid, I moved to Buenos Aires to collaborate with an international 
‘innovation consultancy’ firm in designing the ‘knowledge environment’ 
of one of the world’s largest oil companies’ new headquarters in Latin 
America. On arriving, I joined a team of ten people, including architects, 
engineers, geologists, public relations managers, IT specialists, 
consultants and graphic designers, who were dedicated to the task of 
designing a new office environment for the company’s new purpose-
made 34 storey building. The plan was to relocate over 2000 people from 
a variety of office locations in Buenos Aires to the company’s new, 
flagship building in the luxury harbour area of Puerto Madero. In terms 
not unlike those of the Council, the change of building was seen as an 
opportunity to restructure the company’s ‘workplace strategies’, coming 
up with a blueprint for an ‘ecology of new ways of working’ that would 
promote knowledge and managerial transparency, team work, work 
flexibility and mobility, and the reconciliation of professional and 
lifestyle values. The movement of people from a variety of offices to a 
central location was taken as an opportunity to shake-up and loose old 
and antiquated work habits and practices – an opportunity for making 
work more dynamic and adaptive to change. 
Note the difference in managerial objects: CSIC’s reorganisation 
was spoken of in terms of ‘knowledge management’; at the oil company, 
however, the project was conceived as a change in the way people work. 
Knowledge vs. work: whereas the former is an object of productivity 
(knowledge has to be demonstrated), the latter is an object of production 
(work monstrates itself in action).7 My interest here is in both 
                                         
7  Echoing a distinction first made by Aristotle, José Ortega y Gasset (1992: 178) 
once differentiated between ‘demonstration’ (in the original Greek, deîxis) and 
‘monstration’ (apodeîxis): a second-order proof versus a first-order 
appearance. Reality, Ortega y Gasset held, manifests itself, ‘appears’, in a sort 
of emergent mode, an appearance that is ‘pure exhibition’, pure spectacle 
(ibid. 179). The difference between the deictic and the apodeictic, then, lies in 
mode of appearance: Whereas the former requires a context to convey its 
meaning, the latter emerges simply as its own epistemological context-in-
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‘monstrations’ and ‘demonstrations’, and the way they intersect and re-
articulate different processes and practices to make room for the 
appearance of knowledge as an object of management. In what follows I 
provide a catalogue of institutional forms that render social life liable for 
‘producing knowledge’ – a possibility afforded in the Euro-American 
context by a new imagination of the social as somewhat analogous to a 
form of ‘micro-management’ (Strathern 2006). 
Reversibility:  
Steve Fuller has given the name ‘reversibility’ to a procedural-cum-
epistemological requisite of the production of science that leaves open 
the possibility for revisiting decisions in the future (Fuller 2000). 
Knowledge is tightened up by leaving it deliberately loose. Reversibility 
points to a kind of knowledge practice that strives to capture its own 
sense of perpetual displacement by making room for future 
movements.8 
Reversibility was very much present at the Council; it was absent 
at the oil company. A noted example of reversibility at the Council was 
an informal coffee discussion held by various historians on the topic of 
Spanish historiography.9 The discussion went along the following lines. 
At an informal coffee gathering, a young assistant professor called Luis 
spoke of his recent experience as a visiting fellow at the Institute of 
Historical Research at the University of London. A senior researcher 
                                                                                                                               
action. On the difference between the demonstrative and the monstrative in 
the knowledge economy, see Corsín Jiménez (2008b). 
8  In a study of Cambridge’s Genetics Knowledge Park interdisciplinary 
network, Marilyn Strathern glosses as ‘rehearsals’ the kinds of informal 
exchanges and conversations through which academics outline and prepare 
the grounds for future work (Strathern 2004b: 41). The example Strathern 
provides captures this sense of reversibility well. She reports a casual 
conversation between herself and an informant (an academic himself) later 
becoming the subject of that very informant’s appreciation of his own 
knowledge production (of a seminar talk later delivered by this person). As 
she puts it, the effort of collaborating makes one realise that ‘[f ]rom looking 
forward one finds one has swiveled [sic] round and is looking back’, an 
instrumental talk between colleagues becoming thus an expressive object of 
knowledge (Strathern 2004b: 41). Elsewhere, she describes this opening-up of 
knowledge to its own future re-versions as a faculty for ‘engagement’: ‘For 
nothing more is implied beyond each act of engagement, insofar as each 
contains the possibility of re-engagement without specifying what it would 
be.’ (Strathern 2006: 203) On reversibility more generally, indeed, on its 
capacity to work as an anthropological concept of the concept, see Corsín 
Jiménez and Willerslev (2007). 
9  The following example is drawn from Corsín Jiménez (forthcoming). 
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asked Luis whether during his time at IHR he was ever asked about the 
kind of work done at the National Research Council. Luis thought about 
it for a second and then replied that no, that in fact no one had ever 
asked him about the work being carried out at his home institution back 
in Madrid. A brief silence followed. This was broken by a young 
researcher protesting rather loudly about the arrogant views that Anglo-
American historians had of Spanish scholarship. ‘How many seminars at 
British universities on Spanish history or Latin American issues are 
carried out in Spanish? How many? I mean, some of the people who 
work on these subjects can’t even read Spanish!!’ 
The protest by the young scholar gave rise to an intriguing debate 
on the nature of historical work, including the relationship between 
national identities and reflexive historicity in the making of productive 
scholarship. To the young historian’s declamation about the arrogance 
of Anglo-American academics, a professor replied that ‘There is nothing 
new here. We all know that English is the lingua franca of international 
academia.’ Two researchers noted that, indeed, the historiography of the 
Spanish civil war was still to this day a ‘predominantly British affair’, 
with ‘most of the classic works on the topic having been written by 
British academics.’ The observation prompted a professor to remark that 
‘Spanish academics are very bad at writing synthetic works. We love to 
go on and on over the same topic, but have no skill at synthesising 
information and providing a bird’s eye view of events.’  
Luis, who had remained silent throughout most of the discussion, 
re-entered the conversation at this point. He drew a comparison 
between Spanish and British skills at doing syntheses. The latter, he said, 
were at an advantage, because they had ‘completed their own 
historiography long ago. They have written on and documented every 
conceivable aspect of their own history. From parish or village histories 
to national politics there is nothing left for them to do. No wonder they 
decide to jump over and do other countries’ histories.’ ‘For this reason,’ 
he added ‘we should think of ourselves as being very lucky, because 
there are plenty of topics and themes we can still write about.’ ‘Yes,’ 
remarked a professor in a slightly frustrated tone, ‘but that is also why 
the English have such a capacity for abstraction: because they are one 
step ahead of us all the time. They can spend so much more time 
speculating, creating complex connections between topics, figuring out 
new ways of being creative, because all the basic stuff is there, done.’ 
The conversation at the café shows the complex epistemological 
economies and epistemic reflexivities through which historians working 
at the Council construct the institutional imagination of what it means 
for them to engage in productive scholarship. The production of Spanish 
historiography appears in this context embedded in a rich and dense 
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economy of international collaborations, transversal and cross-country 
interpretations of national academic traditions, seminar cultures, 
language barriers or formative careers. The ‘sociology of knowledge’ of 
history, if I may use the phrase, cannot in this context be apprehended 
through the sociological vocabulary or imagination of externalities or 
public value. Rather, it is inextricably embedded in its own process of 
historicisation, a process that is at once institutional and epistemic, and 
that I dub here reversibility. 
Reversibility was not a dimension of the production of knowledge 
at the oil company. A somewhat similar process of re-contextualisation, 
however, was that of guesswork.10 Guesswork worked as an indigenous 
theory of knowledge management: in the face of lack of evidence and 
information about almost everything we did, we generated relevant 
contexts for action through guesswork. We speculated about the motives 
different senior managers may have had for not attending crucial 
meetings, or for leaving half-way through a meeting, or for providing 
apparently contradictory explanations to different audiences at different 
times; we speculated about the reasons a senior manager may have had 
for appointing as key member of the project someone we thought poorly 
trained for the task ahead, or for withdrawing from the project someone 
whose vision and skills were ideal for its development. We speculated 
about the Argentinian political scene, about the well-known ties and 
friendship that linked the company’s president with the prime minister, 
and about how that relationship might trickle down and affect our own 
work. Importantly, guesswork always centred around people. 
Guesswork was the style of reasoning through which we provided 
theoretical commentary on the personalities of different people and their 
motives for doing different things. So guesswork worked as a cultural 
resource of folk psychology: it was our cultural habit to engage in 
amateur psychologising. It is not as if we did not enquire for the reasons, 
or search for the information that led different people to act and will the 
way they did. We aimed for such knowledge too. But confronted with a 
sense of ambivalence and uncertainty, guesswork provided the most 
significant managerial tool for mapping the structures of the project. In 
this sense, knowledge about the project emerged as a long speculative 
conversation about people’s biographical, personal and psychological 
relationships. Guesswork was also the most reliable source of 
institutional formation, in the sense that a corpus of historical guesswork 
developed over time that legitimated further guesswork about the 
                                         
10  I borrow the notion of ‘guesswork’ from Amy Pollard’s forthcoming PhD 
dissertation (Pollard forthcoming). My warm thanks to her for generously 
sending me her unpublished work. 
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intricacy of the organisation’s entrails. We turned the organisation 
inside-out through the terms of guesswork. At the oil company 
guesswork was an integral means of knowledge management, that is, of 
managing knowledge inside the organisation and of knowing the 
principles of management. 
Fragility and delicacy:  
At the oil company, guesswork was a means of responding and 
accommodating to the politics of uncertainty. But uncertainty never 
showed up alone. Looming large behind the shadow of uncertainty was 
fragility. One of the most remarkable aspects of our job as management 
consultants was the inherent fragility of the knowledge we mobilised. 
We had to be careful about every situation, every detail, every 
conjuncture. We had to watch every word we said, and to whom we 
said it. Saying too much too quickly could endanger the project by 
generating a situation of panic, suspicion and discontent. Words were 
therefore fragile and ought to be pronounced with delicacy. 
Fragility was also a dimension of the cultural management of 
knowledge. There were proper and improper ways of circulating and 
distributing knowledge. Although one of the project’s aims was to 
promote a culture of transparency and collaboration, it soon became 
clear that some knowledge ought best to be kept in the dark. For 
example, on more than one occasion someone in our team was told off 
for copying too many or not enough people in an email’s distribution 
list. Information ought to be treated with delicacy. The processes of 
knowledge, it was intimated, were fragile; too much light could break 
them (cf. Tsoukas 1997). 
Now in some respects fragility is indeed an index of what Michel 
Callon calls ‘hot’ situations of knowledge-making (Callon 1998). 
Knowledge is fragile because there are tensions and conflicts of 
expertise, power or technical competence among those with claims or 
rights over it. But whilst hotness is a useful metaphor to think about the 
politics of knowledge, fragility points instead to the terms of ontological 
self-recognition through which knowledge ‘monstrates’ in action. 
Hotness is a quality of contemporary knowledge politics; fragility is an 
ontological quality of knowledge in the process of producing 
management. 
Yes Economy:  
At the management consultancy firm the production of robust 
knowledge was seen to depend on the stability of future streams of 
funding. This was partly a response to the inherent fragility of 
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knowledge management projects, as noted above. For this reason, 
management consultants are constantly generating new contexts for the 
validity of their knowledge. They say ‘yes’ to everything: new 
responsibilities, new tasks, new duties. This helps them to substantiate 
their deliverables in the future (every ‘yes’ becomes a deliverable of 
knowledge recognised as such in advance by both parties), but it also 
helps their own work roll forward: opening up new avenues for their 
future involvement in the organisation. By taking up new and 
occasionally unsolicited responsibilities today, they open up a time slot 
and an opportunity for accepting additional commitments in the future. 
Optimism:  
Fuelling the Yes Economy from the inside is optimism. Optimism is a 
necessary quality of the future-orientation of knowledge management. It 
is the central force organising management consultants’ ‘structure of 
feeling’ (Williams 1961). In a management context, optimism is a 
necessary inflection of the processes through which knowledge is made 
to appear. 
Consultants boast optimism to display a sense of capacity and 
empowerment. It is an anticipated signal of knowledge’s eventual 
productivity.11 Optimism also elides into a deferral of responsibility, 
into a vague open-endedness and a climate of uncertainty. These are 
conflated: a good knowledge manager can handle uncertainty because 
his optimism is well-founded. This signals the optimist as omniscient, 
and echoes Leibniz’s theocratic optimism, where the best of worlds is a 
necessary corollary of perfect knowledge (Wilson 1983). 
Optimists are shamed by no one and nothing. In fact, if not openly 
looking for confrontation they certainly do not shy away from it. Their 
shamelessness and omniscient self-esteem bestows them with the 
confidence to think of every occasion as a win-win situation: where 
others see problems and cultural barriers, optimists see only lack of 
                                         
11  But too much optimism can also intimidate. During a series of workshops 
organised at the oil company as part of our change management programme, 
we closed our presentation with a quotation by Victor Hugo: ‘The future has 
several names. For the weak, it is the impossible. For the fainthearted, it is the 
unknown. For the thoughtful and valiant, it is an opportunity.’ On reading 
the quote, some participants came forward and expressed reservation. A 
woman remarked that she had never thought of herself as particularly valiant 
or courageous. Though she understood and agreed that some of the 
knowledge management changes being proposed would probably facilitate 
the exchange and circulation of knowledge in her work environment, she felt 
put off by the structure of feeling associated to the changes. If knowledge 
management is for the valiant, then knowledge management was not for her. 
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knowledge and understanding. Granted enough transparency, optimists 
reason, we would all make the same choices. Optimists are therefore 
strangers to no one: because although we do not all know the same 
things, given enough time and explanation, we will. This is important 
because at meetings management consultants behave as such: as though 
there were no strangers in the room. Or rather, as if not knowing 
someone did not entail a condition of strangeness. Social knowledge and 
the shame of strangeness are therefore mutually evacuated in a regime 
of optimism.12 If we follow Warner’s insights above about the public 
indexing stranger-relationality in pure form, then optimism is the 
natural structure of feeling for the production of public knowledge. 
Urgency:  
In management contexts, urgency is not so much a temporal framing of 
events – such that one feels the need of making decisions (because these 
are almost always postponed) – but the way for consultants to embed 
themselves in the organisation. At the oil company, urgency worked as a 
metaphor for expertise. It was invoked every time we wanted to lay 
claims and legitimate the relevance of our expert knowledge: we would 
say things such as, ‘in our experience now is the time for XXX’ or ‘the 
opportunity costs of not doing XXX now will be enormous’. 
Importantly, urgency was also explicitly stated as a quality of 
knowledge management. By stamping quotidian activities with the 
imprimatur of urgency, management consultants opened-up a space for 
their own expert presence in the future. 
Serendipity and capriciousness:  
Academic knowledge travels in ways that are serendipitous (cf. Merton 
& Barber 2004). Over a lunch or coffee, or in the brief interlude that 
precedes a meeting or a seminar talk, academics exchange references, 
comment on books they are reading, conferences they have or will be 
attending, or websites with information they have found useful. Much 
of this information is forgotten or ignored. Some, however, finds its way 
into the production of scholarship. Serendipity provides an image for 
knowledge that emerges on the margins of other knowledge: on 
footnotes or references, through the metaphorical connotations of 
words, via friends and acquaintances. On the other hand, as a mode of 
production of knowledge, serendipity is completely alien to 
                                         
12  Robert Jackall hints at this when he writes of corporate managers’ rational 
self-control over their own bodies that they ‘must learn to streamline oneself 
shamelessly’ (Jackall 1988: 74). 
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management consultancy work. At most, it is anecdotal, something to 
amuse with over a business lunch, to impress an audience during a 
workshop, to introduce a note of cynical scepticism and distance 
towards one’s own work. Insofar as it is a cue for marginal knowledge, it 
remains just that: marginal. 
There is, however, a different mode of marginal productivity of 
knowledge that is widely mobilised in managerial contexts. In 
contradistinction from serendipity, I shall call it capriciousness.13 Like 
serendipity, capriciousness emerges too on the sides of standardised and 
institutionalised modes of production. But unlike serendipity it accrues 
value and managerial purchase through acts of conspicuous appearance 
and extreme visibility; such movement between the visible and the 
invisible links capriciousness to the management of secrecy. At the oil 
company, for instance, some of our interlocutors inside the company 
were extremely secretive about certain aspects of the project. Crucial to 
the management of such knowledge was making it clear that they were in 
possession of knowledge not known to us: the capacity to manage 
company secrets is something external consultants do not have. The 
point is not moot because, pressed to make room and develop a 
‘capacity for innovation’, many firms are turning today to knowledge 
management consultants to provide the relevant expertise. Outsiders are 
therefore brought in to make relevant to insiders knowledge they 
already have, a situation that is likely to provoke discomfort. 
Capriciousness is therefore what knowledge produced by insiders looks 
like when pressed to accommodate to a knowledge management 
programme. 
Repetition:  
Seen as a rhythmic pattern, the workday of researchers appears 
monotonous and repetitive. Biblical philologists, for instance, would 
arrive to work at their offices between 8–9am every day, would dedicate 
the morning to administrative tasks, would take half an hour on a coffee 
break with their peers between 11 and 11:30am, only to return to further 
administrative tasks until lunch time at 2pm. The same people would go 
out for coffee and lunch breaks every day. At around 4pm they would 
be back in their offices. Afternoons and evenings were quieter and most 
philologists would employ this time in their own investigations, either 
in the solitude of their offices or in the Centre’s library, leaving for home 
                                         
13  Following Robert Jackall’s terminology (Jackall 1988: 73). For Jackall, 
‘managers have a sharply defined sense not only of the contingency but of the 
capriciousness of organisational life.’ 
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between 7–8pm. Scholarship thus took shape as a structure of habit and 
routine. 
At the oil company, the work life of knowledge managers was of a 
more unstable and unpredictable nature. There were telephone calls to 
ad hoc meetings, urgent requests for disparate kinds of information, 
random audits of our work by the project’s internal supervisor. 
Notwithstanding the apparently erratic nature of much of this work, 
most of it was sourced on a consolidated and structured database of 
information. Not a day went by, for example, without having to work on 
a PowerPoint presentation or an Excel sheet. These documents were 
always versions of older documents. Much of this work consisted in 
browsing through digital archives looking for past presentations, 
identifying images or texts that would serve present purposes, copying 
and pasting them into the new presentation. In Tardean fashion, in this 
context ‘innovations are, for the most part, combinations of previous 
examples’ (Tarde 2000 [1899]: 23). As important as these documents 
were, however, they actually made little pedagogical impact. It was their 
recurrent use and their becoming icons of knowledge management that 
seemed to make a difference. The later stages of our knowledge 
management programme, for example, required the organisation of over 
a hundred workshops, reaching c. 10% of the company’s population. At 
each workshop we would show the same PowerPoint presentation, 
explaining the basics of the changed management programme to 
different audiences. Our script was well rehearsed and soon after our 
sixth or seventh workshop we would anticipate the directions and turns 
that different audiences would take during question time. We would 
talk and go over the same protocols and proceedings, introducing subtle 
variations and what might look like concessions to our audiences. We 
shifted and adapted our knowledge management script, making it look 
adaptive and responsive to the needs of users. But adaptiveness 
emerged only as a marginal accretion. In the last instance, the 
management of knowledge was pedagogically effective because of the 
economic scale of our programme – because we were given the chance 
to repeat one hundred times the same message to different members of 
the organisation. If the economy of knowledge of scholarship is based on 
the structural repetition of habit and routine, the economy of knowledge 
of management is based on the actual scale of repetition (Corsín Jiménez 
2008a; Thrift 2005: 215). 
Structure:  
As intimated above, structure is central to the management of both 
knowledge and research. In an economy of scholarship, the production 
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of knowledge is seen to be favoured by the institutional organisation of 
research as structure. In a managerial economy, the production of 
knowledge is seen to be favoured by the institutional structure of scale. 
Thus, despite all the talk about the non-linearity and autopoeises of 
knowledge, both at the oil company and the research council, those 
involved in the production of knowledge – not to mention those with a 
commitment to its productivity – spent most of their time trying to 
identify and bring to the fore the structures that would make knowledge 
appear. The challenge for all is how to render new knowledge pliable to 
existing structures. Never have the dictums of structural-functionalism 
been truer than in the knowledge economy: when urged to apprehend 
and make sense of an intangible asset such as new knowledge, both the 
people I worked for at the oil company and academics at the Research 
Council resorted to institutional structures to make sense of, or resist the 
changes brought before them. The relationship to knowledge is therefore 
always structural, even if the conditions and qualities of such a structure 
vary. When looking to understand what knowledge is and how it works, 
one should therefore at some point always ask what the structure of its 
relationality is. 
Deliverables:  
An interesting aspect of the structural relationality of knowledge is its 
moment of demonstration: when the production of knowledge becomes 
productive and thus self-consciously articulated and apprehended as a 
knowledge object of sorts. When a knowledge worker thinks to himself, 
‘How do I account for my day?’ (Strathern 2004b: 23), what concerns 
him is the productivity of knowledge. When a client asks the 
management consultant that works for him, ‘How should I account for 
your day?’, what concerns him is the processes that structure the mode 
of production of knowledge.14 In both cases, deliverability provides a 
categorical justification for management’s relation to knowledge – for 
the management of knowledge. 
Pollution:  
The pinnacle of our knowledge management programme at the oil 
company was the implementation of a ‘clear desk policy’. This required 
                                         
14  The former is a question about the economy of labour and what Simon 
Schaffer has called the ‘geography of intelligence’ (Schaffer 1994: 223): an 
inquiry into the political and economic structures of the modes of production 
of knowledge. The latter, on the other hand, is a question about the cultural 
and moral practices that circumscribe and account for knowledge as a 
boundary object. 
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employees to leave their desks clear of all papers, personal objects and 
removable storage media before they left the office every day. A central 
part of the consultants’ philosophical approach to knowledge 
management, the clear desk policy was intended to maintain the 
appearance of a new working environment, to discourage the retention 
of unnecessary paper, to promote the storage of classified and sensitive 
documents and thus reduce the risk of unauthorised access to 
information, and in the long run to help promote mobile work by 
ensuring that shared workspaces would not become owned by 
individuals over time. 
Clear desks were the tip of a wider knowledge management 
programme that encompassed a new architecture of digital information 
storage and archiving, new ways of handling the paper legacy, and an 
overall effort at generating cross-cutting and transversal organisational 
synergies. In this model, paper became a token and emblem of 
informational pollution. ‘Information’, consultants would argue, ‘is free, 
what varies are the mediums (paper, digital) through which it travels.’ 
Paper was therefore seen as a (superfluous) intermediary between 
information and efficiency. In its ideal form, pure information was paper 
free. 
In the economy of knowledge management, purity is also what 
lends information its public quality. Information in a state of maximal 
purity is digitally open, freely accessible by all, and stored once and only 
once in a consolidated and robust archive. Pure information is therefore 
transparent: everybody knows where it is archived, how to access and 
retrieve it, and who is or should be responsible for keeping the 
information up to date. Moreover, the public transparency of 
information is what activates it as a shameless object. However, when 
invited to rethink the architecture of their archiving systems, our clients 
at the oil company would often look to us with scepticism: people, they 
said, will hesitate when it comes to giving up information to some 
centralised intelligent system. An explanation often given was that 
people hold on to paper copies of all information because they do not 
want to find themselves empty-handed whenever their bosses come 
around asking for unexpected or long-dated copies of paperwork. Paper 
mediates the relation that people have to information through the 
relationships they have to other people (and their bosses in particular), 
and paper archives embody the structure of all such personal 
relationships. Consultants would respond nonetheless, saying that a 
common archiving system would help take responsibility away from 
people and distribute it equally among everyone: information would no 
longer be ‘owned’ by an individual but would be publicly available and 
accessible through the system. Individuals would therefore be spared 
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the embarrassment of not knowing or not having a particular piece of 
information when asked by their bosses. Relations (to information) and 
relationships (to people) would be kept apart. Notwithstanding, on 
being told about the alleged shamelessness and relational purity of 
information, some employees grinned and murmured that ‘information 
may be public, knowledge is not’.  
At the Research Council, discussions about the coherence or 
holding together of knowledge were also framed in terms of pollution. 
For instance, the call for disbanding academic departments was fiercely 
resisted by many on the grounds of disciplinary integrity and purity. 
Some researchers resorted to the vocabulary of historical identities: for 
example, Spanish philologists lay claims to a historical school of classical 
philological work whose genealogy to the present would be shamefully 
interrupted if the department was disbanded. On the other hand, certain 
social scientists, especially those of a statistical bent, were dismayed at 
the prospect of having to share the same workspace and resources 
(especially, the same library) as philologists, whom they thought of as 
academic antiquarians. For some quantitative sociologists, the building 
that hosted the humanities prior to the relocation was a nineteenth-
century relic that remained infused with the corrupted and polluting air 
of a National Catholic bureaucracy. The very idea of having to 
collaborate with some of these humanities scholars was repulsive to 
them. Some mixtures of knowledge would simply never blend. 
Conclusion 
How is knowledge produced? Gibbons et al. famously observed that the 
historical economy of knowledge can be analysed in terms of two 
regimes of production: Mode 1, characteristic of the epistemic culture of 
science and research, academically-driven and disciplinary-based; and 
Mode 2, problem-oriented, interdisciplinary, context-driven and socially 
robust (Gibbons et al. 1994). To this classification, Dominic Foray has 
added a third mode, what he calls ‘integrative knowledge’, typified by 
the production of metrological norms and standards (Foray 2006: 67–68). 
Modes 1 and 2 and the model of integrative knowledge are all 
descriptions of the organisation of the production of knowledge that 
take the public value of knowledge for granted: public value is what the 
organisation of knowledge should ideally aim for. Such models put 
knowledge on a par with society, as if the one was a homological 
reflection of the other. Such economic sociology participates of what I 
have called elsewhere a proportional imagination, that makes concepts 
and social forms work in proportional correlation to one another (Corsín 
Jiménez 2008c). Thus, the important point about Hayek’s sociology is 
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not that it invokes the fiction of a normative equation between 
Knowledge, Society and the Market, but that it does so by making these 
terms work as proportionate forms of one another. 
My concern in this article has been to elucidate some of the 
institutional forms that the labour of knowledge assumes in the process 
of producing management, and in particular to interrogate the extent to 
which ‘knowledge’, ‘management’ and ‘public value’ may indeed be 
said to appear as proportions of one another. Building on Marilyn 
Strathern’s original contrast of research and managerial economies of 
knowledge (Strathern 2004a; Strathern 2006), I have tried to provide 
ethnographic substance to the modern sociological oscillation that lends 
‘knowledge’ both productive and social capacities. 
When put to the ethnographic test we have seen that the 
production and flow of knowledge in management contexts rarely 
assumes a correlative form of any kind. Knowledge is hardly if ever self-
combustive, it never flows uninterruptedly in a horizontal way, and its 
use, circulation and appropriation is almost always likely to produce 
effects that are shameful, disgusting and most certainly repudiated, or at 
the very least calling for a cautious suspension. We have seen some 
examples above: the objectifications of knowledge as a fragile piece, that 
needs to be handled with delicacy; the calls for making knowledge self-
contextualised, sometimes to reverse upon itself, even if this provokes 
uncertainty or instability; the demands to make knowledge dependant 
on its future others: through urgency, deliverability and the optimism of 
a ‘Yes Economy’, which are always contingent, despite the gloss of their 
affirmative appearance; the structural serendipity and capriciousness of 
knowledge, always built upon an economy of repetition. Finally, 
knowledge’s polluting effects, which ambiguously play on the 
shamelessness and purity of structure. 
Unlike the horizontal/proportional equation of knowledge with 
Society, Economy and other objects of a market sociology (such as 
governance, innovation or management), the ethnographic 
indeterminacy of knowledge requires first to identify and label the 
processes whereby knowledge is laboured into an object capable of 
flowing or moving at all. One would say that the labour of knowledge 
creates a vertical incision on its potential for flow. In this sense, the 
crucial dimension that such verticality lends to the economy of 
knowledge is to distinguish between the agency and the capability of its 
relations (cf. Sen 1993); between externalities, for instance, and 
reversibles. Relational knowledge carries and is co-extensive with an 
agency; but it also carries and is co-extensive with a set of capabilities. 
Knowledge may have an inclination or agency to pollute (externalities), 
but under certain circumstances it may not be capable to do so, or its 
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capabilities may extend its agency in novel and unexpected directions 
(reversibles). For this reason, it is all very well to speak of knowledge as an 
object as a public good, but knowledge as a process may only be dubbed 
public if one is willing to recognise the labour of knowledge as a socially 
productive/public good itself (Corsín Jiménez 2008b).15 
The distinction between the horizontality:verticality of knowledge 
and its agency:capability brings me to my final point. Knowledge is 
sometimes spoken of as a source of instability and pollution; sometimes, 
it is called-for because of its structural coherence and purity. For 
philologists, we have seen, research is a vertical/intensive process to be 
distinguished from the horizontal/communicative productivity of 
knowledge. The labour of scholarship is imagined in terms of a quiet 
and craft economy of repetition, where knowledge folds and refolds 
over itself, creating pools of stable, integrated scholarship. For 
management consultants, on the other hand, the productivity of 
knowledge is imagined as a horizontal process: a flexible, transparent 
and instantaneous breaking-down of physical and conceptual barriers 
through communication. Whilst knowledge is an input to be vertically 
laboured in the former, it is the outcome of a horizontal process of 
communication in the latter: an economy of repetitive verticality vs. an 
economy of horizontal excess. 
Note how the processes through which different kinds of 
knowledge are produced yield different kinds of effects. Such effects are 
the consequence of a gradient: there is always a vertical point of reference 
that is summoned (whether explicitly, more often than not, implicitly) to 
explain or justify the horizontal, and vice versa: 
Any vocabulary we might adopt to follow the engagement of non-
humans into the social link should consider both the succession of 
hands that transport a statement and the succession of transformations 
undergone by that statement… The word ‘statement’ therefore refers… 
to the gradient that carries us from words to things and from things to 
words. […] We thus define two dimensions: association… and 
substitution… To simplify even further, we can think of these as the 
AND dimension … and the OR dimension… Any engagement of non-
humans can be traced both by its position on the AND–OR axes and by 
the recording of the AND and OR positions which have successively 
defined it. The vertical dimension corresponds to the exploration of 
substitutions, and the horizontal dimension corresponds to the number 
                                         
15  My use of the term ‘labour’ at this point in the argument is deliberate (vs., for 
example, ‘production’), to signpost a certain distance from descriptions of 
knowledge as an immaterial good or cognitive capital (Hardt & Negri 2000; 
Lazzarato 1996). Following Caffentzis, I want to bring attention to the patterns 
of production that organise the labour of knowledge (Caffentzis 2007), still to 
this day built on the imagery of machine labour (see also Schaffer 1994). 
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of actors which have attached themselves to the innovation. (Latour 
1991: 106) 
Latour’s argument is a propos the effect of technology and technological 
equipments in the making durable of Society as a sociological object – 
although of course what consolidates Society is not the extensibility and 
concatenary capacities of actants but Latour’s own proportional 
imagination. Thus we see how the vertical and the horizontal are played-off 
against each other to form or disjoint a proportion, a gradient. And this, I 
think, is worth a pause. 
My final proposition is that the production of knowledge in the 
modern age is largely premised on the creation of such a sense of 
magnitudinous difference. Or rather, that there is a tension between 
commensurability and dis/proportionality in the way we imagine 
‘knowledge’ as a productive category of social theory. This is also what 
renders disproportionality the effect through which social theory 
discovers its own productivity in modern society: it makes us see 
knowledge when knowledge is out-of-synch with our categories of 
sociological description.  
Given the remarkable ways in which commensurability and 
dis/proportionate work as forms for one another, I am tempted to 
conclude this article with a Strathernian suggestion. In what I take to be 
one of her most insightful propositions, Strathern has suggested that 
social relationships may be co-constitutive of their anthropological 
objects of study through the purchase lent to them by analytical 
relationality. Relationality is a form of knowledge capable of making 
both the social and the analytical visible at once.16 What if, however, we 
were to render relationality itself disproportionate? What form would 
relationality need to take to become commensurable once again with the 
social? 
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